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ABSTRACT
Patient safety and medical errors in ambulatory
primary care are receiving increasing attention
from policy makers, accreditation bodies and re-
searchers, as well as by practising family physicians
and their patients.While a great deal of progress has
been made in understanding errors in hospital
settings, it is important to recognise that ambulat-
ory settings pose a very large and diﬀerent set of
challenges and that the types of hazards that exist
and the strategies required to reduce them are very
diﬀerent.
What is needed is a logical theoretical model for
understanding the causes of errors in primary care,
the role of healthcare systems in contributing to
errors, the propagation of errors through complex
systems and, importantly, for understanding am-
bulatory primary care in the context of the larger
healthcare system. The authors have developed
such a model using a formal ‘systems engineering’
approach borrowed from the management sciences
and engineering. This approach has not previously
been formally described in the medical literature.
This paper outlines the formal systems approach,
presents our visual model of the system, and
describes some experiences with and potential
applications of the model for monitoring and
improving safety. Applications include providing
a framework to help focus research eﬀorts, creation
of new (visual) error reporting and taxonomy
systems, furnishing a common and unambiguous
vision for the healthcare team, and facilitating
retrospective and prospective analyses of errors
and adverse events. It is aimed at system redesign
for safety improvement through a computer-based
patient-centred safety enhancement and monitor-
ing instrument (SEMI-P). This model can be inte-
grated with electronic medical records (EMRs).
Keywords: EMR,medical errors, modelling, patient
safety, quality, systems, visualisation
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Introduction
The problem of errors in health care
As a result of the well-known reports on safety and
quality from the Institute of Medicine (IOM) and
other inﬂuential publications, patient safety is receiv-
ing increasing attention from all parties that are
involved in health care including doctors, nurses,
other healthcare workers, clinics, hospitals, third-party
payers, accreditation bodies (most notably in the
United States [US], the Joint Commission on Accred-
itation of Healthcare Organizations [JCAHO]) and,
importantly, the patients themselves.1–11 This concern
and attention has begun to result in some signiﬁcant
advances.
However, progress is slow and far short of expec-
tations.12,13 The healthcare industry has continued to
lag behind the major safety developments that have
taken place in other high-risk industries such as
aviation, defence, nuclear and chemical industries.
Fragmentation, decentralisation and the lack of a safety
culture in health care are among the major causes of
this lag. In addition, healthcare systems are highly
complex, involving multiple diverse entities with soph-
isticated and unpredictable interactions that make
them much more diﬃcult to study.
Errors in primary care
While much information exists about hospital-based
errors, the IOM acknowledges the dearth of data from
oﬃce-based settings. Much of what is known so far
comes from the American Academy of Family Phys-
icians (AAFP) Policy Center’s Studies.14–16 From their
US studies of errors reported by family physicians,
nearly 66% of errors are caused by process and
charting problems (such as misﬁled lab results, failure
to schedule follow-ups), 15% by non-compliance,
13% by medication errors and 3% each are caused
by clinical judgement and interdisciplinary communi-
cation problems. Half the errors did not appear to
aﬀect patients, but one in ten led to worsening illness,
one in ﬁve to delayed care, one in four to patient upset
and one in 20 led to hospitalisation. Other important
studies in primary care have examined errors reported
by physicians and staﬀ, errors perceived by patients,
adverse drug events, and missing information.17–23
Much remains to be done.
Importance of the ‘system’
A common and important thread that runs through
all of the most inﬂuential work on patient safety is the
importance of seeing safety as a ‘systems’ property.
Most notably, the IOM reports describe the current
US healthcare system as a fragmented and decentral-
ised ‘non-system’ and identify this ‘non-system’ as a
major source of medical errors.1,2 The challenge is to
understand the current systems as the context in
which errors occur so that we can begin to take steps
towards redesigning the systems for safer care. In this
process, it is hoped that healthcare organisations,
accreditation bodies, and the legal system will gradu-
ally shift from the prevailing culture of blame to a
culture of safety in which individuals are held account-
able for their actions but are not blamed or punished
for the majority of errors that are due to system
problems.24–26
Many organisations are trying to adopt such an
approach that focuses on the system and some are
using analytical methods such as root cause analysis
for retrospective analysis of adverse events and failure
mode and events analysis for prospective anticipation
of errors. Although they represent progress, these and
other eﬀorts to focus on the system are hampered by
the sheer complexity of the processes of healthcare
delivery, the involvement of multiple personnel, the
lack of standardisation, and the fragmentation and
decentralisation of the healthcare system as awhole. In
addition, success of these eﬀorts will require that the
information andunderstanding gained be conveyed in
an easily understood fashion so that it can be widely
disseminated to all relevant parties within an organ-
isation.
What is needed to complement and stimulate these
system-based eﬀorts is an approach that is able to
capture the complexity of the system and facilitate
analyses, development of system-based solutions and
dissemination of results. Such an approach exists; it is
known formally in the engineering and management
ﬁelds as ‘the systems approach’, or ‘systems engineer-
ing’. In health care the term ‘systems approach’ is
widely used to convey a general focus on system issues
as described above. However, the approach that we
are presenting here is a speciﬁc one borrowed from
management science and engineering. For clarity we
shall refer to it as the systems engineering approach.
This approach has beenwidely used in other industries
with considerable success and has been advocated
by the IOM.1,2 Despite the widespread acknowledge-
ment of the importance of systems and the IOM’s
endorsement of systems engineering, the approach
has not previously been formally described in the
medical literature. We will now give a brief overview
of this approach and describe how we have used it to
develop a visual model of the healthcare system that
has helped us to understand safety and errors in
primary care and enhance safety education, at under-
and postgraduate levels, as well as to improve safety
practices.
Computer visualisation of patient safety in primary care 137
Systems engineering: a very
brief overview of the
established philosophy
The systems engineering approach has been widely
used in engineering, nuclear power and other safety-
critical industries with a great deal of success.27–32
There is a very large number of professional societies,
associations, institutes and academic departments
that propagate systems thinking and practice. Most
masters’ programmes in business administration in-
corporate this discipline and some of its techniques in
their curricula. While it is important to acknowledge
that health care is not the same as these other indus-
tries, it would be unwise to ignore the lessons that have
been learned in these other contexts. In fact, the systems
engineering approach has been used in many diverse
contexts and its widespread success is testament to its
generalisability.
The origins of the systems engineering approach
can best be seen in the philosophy of holism.Holism is
deﬁned as: the tendency in nature to form wholes that
are greater and better than the sum of the parts, by
creative evolution.
This approach centres on acknowledging the exist-
ence of wholes (systems) that are greater and better
than the sum of their parts (components) due to
multiple interactions and synergism between these
components. It therefore mandates the study of these
interactions and synergies (or lack thereof) and their
eﬀects on the whole system. Any study or evaluation
that is limited to individual components and fails to
acknowledge their interactions is ﬂawed and inad-
equate. By studying and understanding not only the
individual components of a system but also the way in
which these components interact andwork together as
a whole, the systems engineering approach provides
for meaningful evaluation and eﬀective intervention
to improve the functioning of any system. It has been
applied in a vast variety of human endeavours ranging
from political campaigns to space exploration. The
approach can be qualitative and/or quantitative. The
terms ‘management science’ and ‘operations research’
(OR) are frequently used to refer to the quantitative
aspects. The beginnings of OR can be traced to World
War II, when the United States and Britain employed
many of their best mathematicians and physicists to
analyse and optimise military operations.
Subsequent development of new techniques that
could be applied to a host of decision-making prob-
lems, combined with the availability of powerful
computers, allowed these techniques to be enhanced
and applied rapidly to large-scale optimisation prob-
lems, taking into account constraintson resources.These
techniques can be broadly classiﬁed as deterministic
(relying on single estimates of input data) and prob-
abilistic (acknowledging uncertainty in the input data).
The latter are particularly relevant to risk and reli-
ability problems in equipment, human behaviour and
their interaction. Healthcare systems can derive great
beneﬁts from the use of the various OR techniques,
including multi-objective and multi-resource optim-
isation algorithms. Recent developments, for example in
artiﬁcial neural networks, expert systems and relational
databases, are best seen in the context of the systems
engineering approach.
Systems engineering is a comprehensive approach
that calls for and encourages ‘transdisciplinary’ teams
to attack decision-making problems. This approach is
made up of two essential steps, known as ‘analysis’ and
‘synthesis’. The ﬁrst is to ‘analyse’ the problem through
clear identiﬁcation of all the entities and processes
involved. The second is to ‘synthesise’ or model by
clearly establishing the interactions or desired inter-
actions between these entities and processes. We will
illustrate this approach by describing how it was used
to develop our visual model.
Implementation of the systems
engineering approach to
modelling of the healthcare
system: analysis and synthesis
The two key steps in the systems approach, namely
analysis and synthesis, are achieved as follows.
Analysis
This is achieved through clear identiﬁcation of all the
processes and entities involved in the healthcare system,
and the domains in which they exist. The processes are
the activities or steps that take place. For our analysis
we identiﬁed the ﬁve basic processes of care listed in
Box 1(a). Once the processes have been identiﬁed, the
next step is to acknowledge all the various entities that
are involved in these processes. These will include
people as well as equipment and other items that
are involved, as shown in Box 1(b). Finally, it is
important to deﬁne the domains in which the pro-
cesses and entities exist. In ourmodel for primary care
patient safety we needed to capture all the domains
with which the patient might interact, that is, the
entire healthcare system. The list of domains is given
in Box 1(c).
The analysis, that is, identiﬁcation of these pro-
cesses, entities and domains, should be as detailed as
possible, within the time/resource constraints under
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which one is working. The next step is to construct the
model, that is, synthesis.
Synthesis
This requires that for each domain there is clear
identiﬁcation of all the interactions or desired inter-
actions between processes and entities. These are then
expressed in a systems mode. The resulting model is
greater and better than the sumof the individual parts.
By modelling the healthcare system using the systems
engineering approach, healthcare professionals and
policy makers can start to address many of the prob-
lems of fragmentation and decentralisation, that
plague the current healthcare ‘non-system’, particu-
larly that of the US. In the approach presented here,
synthesis is achieved by a visual portrayal of all the
processes, entities, interactions and the temporal re-
lationships involved in each domain. Such a visualised
model can permit a common language so that all parties
can focus their energies together toward achieving
safer health care.
The ﬁrst step in this synthesis is to formulate an
overallmodel of themacro-system, as shown inFigure 1.
This is a high-level view of the healthcare system. The
processes listed above are represented by the radials.
The processes of health care are recognised to occur in
a cyclical fashion as shown by the clockwise progression
around the circle from Assessment to Plan to Im-
plementation, Feedback, Review and back to Assess-
ment again.
These processes in the cycle of care take place in
various domains (as identiﬁed above) that are depicted
by concentric circles. The increasing sizes of the circles
depict the enlarging involvement of the system,
starting from the patient level (circle no. 0) at the centre
to the international health authority level (circle no. n)
on the outside. The innermost circle represents the
patient in his/her own domain (that is, home/com-
munity) and recognises that this is the place where
most health care actually occurs. International author-
ities, depicted by the outer circles, play an important
role in devising public health policies that can impact
everyday management of patients in primary care.
Oﬃce-based care, the focus of primary care, is
represented by circle no. 1. Depending on the system
under study, circle no. 2 might represent the emer-
gency room and no. 3 might represent the hospital
inpatient setting, and so on.
The intersections between the circles and the radials
represent the variousmicro-systemswithin the overall
macro-system. Alphanumeric codes are used to ident-
ify each micro-system unambiguously. For example,
1A represents assessment of the patient in the oﬃce
setting (circle 1).
The next level in synthesising the model is to
construct the micro-system diagrams that show how
Box 1 Processes, entities and domains of care modelled
(a) Processes of care
. Assessment (of the patient)
. Plan (formulation of a plan of management)
. Implementation (of the plan)
. Feedback (from the patient and other parts of the system, regarding the patient’s progress, results
of investigations and interventions, and so on)
. Review and learn (evolution of the system)
(b) Entities involved in these processes (these are numerous but can be classiﬁed broadly)
. Patients, families and communities
. Health system workers
. Leadership and teams
. Non-human entities such as equipment, supplies, charts, EMR and so on
(c) Domains in which care processes takes place
. Home/community
. Ambulatory primary care
. Ambulatory specialty care
. Nursing home/long-term care
. Emergency room
. Inpatient
. Regulatory authorities (local/national/international) – these are included because of their ability
to inﬂuence care in the other domains
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the entities listed earlier interact at each point in the
cycle. Depending on the purpose for which the model
will be employed, the synthesis could be more or less
detailed and could focus on speciﬁc areas of interest.
Each of the micro-systems is represented by two
diagrams – an ‘inﬂuence’ diagram and a precedence
diagram. The inﬂuence diagram depicts the entities,
their interactions and the processes that take place.
The precedence diagram shows these relationships in
terms of chronology.
Figure 2(a) is a simpliﬁed example of the ‘inﬂuence’
diagram for micro-systems 1A and 1P. In general, a
separate diagram is used to depict each micro-system.
However, in this presentation we have chosen to
combine the Assessment and Plan processes since
they occur in close proximity to one another and
involve many of the same entities and interactions.
The diagram depicts the entities involved (doctor,
patient, nurse, medical record, and so on) and the
interactions that take place between them. Each inter-
action is shown as an arrow. Errors or safety problems
can originate at any point in the system.
Figure 2(b) is the corresponding simpliﬁed ‘pre-
cedence’ diagram. This depicts the chronology of the
interactions/steps that must take place. This helps in
understanding the time-dependence of the interac-
tions/steps and in identifying problems such as
waiting time, fatigue, and delays and ambiguities in
communication and hand-oﬀs.
The macro-system and micro-system diagrams are
computerised and contain hyperlinks that facilitate
hierarchical links and dynamic data links with various
databases and reporting templates. For example, any
point on the inﬂuence diagram can be linked elec-
tronically to a table containing relevant data about
errors that are known to occur at that point in the
system with details of frequency and consequences of
these errors as well as corrective action.
Discussion
It is well known that visual portrayal of a system is an
eﬃcient representation strategy, one that enhances
both learning and memory. Speciﬁcally, a visual model
can enhance the user’s identiﬁcation of the problem,
its understanding, solution and communication with
minimum ambiguity. Advantage of this has been taken
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in numerous other domains including the military,
aviation industry, construction and manufacturing.
Themodel we have presented and used is adaptable,
upgradable, easily transferable, can be integrated into
electronic medical records/electronic health records
(EMRs/EHRs) and can provide the following functions:
. Research: The visual model provides a common
‘road map’ for researchers by helping to break
down the patient safety problem into its component
parts, and helping scholars to understand the re-
lationships between the parts. This approach can
help researchers to identify the entities, domains
and processes that require study, and to see their
research in the context of the whole system; in other
words, to see their own and others’ work as part of
the ‘whole picture’.
. Creation of an intuitive visual error taxonomy and
reporting system: Error taxonomies have an import-
ant role to play in classiﬁcation and communication
of error data. Most taxonomies suﬀer from prob-
lems of ambiguity and accessibility due to their high
complexity. Using a visual format is one way of
making taxonomies more manageable from the
user’s perspective. For example, to facilitate error
reporting, the visual model would be incorporated
into a computer database and the reporter could
simply click on the relevant part of the macro-
system model on their computer screen to identify
the domain and process inwhich the error occurred.
They would then be presented with the relevant
micro-system model and they would click on the
appropriate point to identify the entity or interac-
tion where the error took place. They would then
have the opportunity to enter detailed information
regarding the circumstances, causes and conse-
quences of the error. Collecting data in this fashion
gives rise to a ‘visual database’ that can be accessed
by the same ‘point and click’ approach. Such a
database could be used for research, or quality
improvement purposes or even be integrated into
an EMR (incorporating inductive and deductive
decision support systems) to provide real-time
error information to healthcare workers at the point
of care.
. Analysis: Various analytical methods are used by
safety experts to examine the causes of adverse events
(such as root cause analysis), as well as to look
prospectively and anticipate errors and evaluate
their potential consequences (for instance, failure
ASSESSMENT        PLAN
Chart
Third party Third party
NurseNurse
Provider
Hyperlink to Macro-model
Figure 2(a) Micro-system: inﬂuence diagram – sites 1A and 1P
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modes and eﬀects analysis).33,34 Woolf et al have
reported the use of cascade analysis to delineate the
causal chain of events for primary care errors.35
While the details of these analyses are beyond the
scope of this paper, it is worth noting that the
computer-based visual modelling approach that
we have proposed can be very helpful as a tool to
enhance/augment these methods of analysis.
. Team-building: The model provides a common and
shared vision for formation of healthcare teams,
including the patient in the team. This visual
portrayal can help each individual to understand
their role within the system and their relationship to
the larger system.
. Training: Interdisciplinary education of healthcare
providers, including students, nurses, physicians, as
advocated by theDepartment ofHealth andHuman
Services.6 The model can help identify educational
needs and also be used as an educational tool.
. Patient education: Helping patients to understand
their role within the larger system and thus em-
powering them to advocate for themselves and
potentially leading to reductions in patient-attribu-
table errors.36
. Patient tracking: Providing a means to track a
patient’s encounters with the healthcare system
over time, recording their interactions across the
various parts of the system (for example, oﬃce,
emergency department, inpatient setting). This can
help improve continuity of care and reduce the risk
of ‘hand-oﬀ ’ errors that occur at transitions, such as
from inpatient to oﬃce.
. Dissemination of information: The model facilitates
visual portrayal of complex information that can
be tailored for each stakeholder, ranging from the
individual patient, to the safety committee of the
organisation, to a national accreditation body.
The computerised visual database format described
earlier could provide a user-friendly interface.
The authors have used these macro- and micro-
systems models in various ways with success, includ-
ing development of an error survey tool termed ‘safety
enhancement and monitoring instrument’ (SEMI-P).
This tool identiﬁes multiple errors at each point in the
system and elicits staﬀ perceptions of frequency and
severity of each. It has been used to help form teams to
identify priorities for quality improvement, and also
to estimate the eﬀects of implementation of an EMR
on perceived safety hazards within a practice.37–39
Figure 3 shows an example of the SEMI-P. Themodels
have also been successfully used as the basis of patient
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safety training programmes for medical students and
residents.40,41 Further, the authors are currently col-
laborating with leading national and international
primary care error taxonomy developers to use the
visual system models as an interactive interface, with
the aim of creating an unambiguous and intuitive
visual error database of the kind described above. Our
experience to date suggests that a variety of healthcare
workers are able to relate to the visual models and ﬁnd
them helpful in understanding their roles within the
system as well as opportunities for errors and ways of
preventing them.
The extent to which healthcare workers will relate
intuitively to this visual systems approach is uncertain
and will likely vary with the type of training received
and the nature of the healthcare systems in a particular
country. Advances in healthcare training incorpor-
ating team perspectives and informatics will likely
facilitate acceptance of this kind of approach.
To be maximally relevant and useful, models such
as the ones presented need to be adapted to the user’s
speciﬁc circumstances and needs. This can be labour-
intensive and requires training.
Conclusions
Safety is increasingly being recognised as a system
property. The challenge faced by today’s healthcare
leaders (in the US at least) is to understand the current
fragmented and decentralised systems as the context
in which errors occur so that we can begin to take steps
towards redesigning the systems to prevent errors and
reduce the potential for harm to our patients.1
A comprehensive and transdisciplinary systems
approach has been applied to identify and analyse
the processes, entities and domains of health care
as well as to synthesise the interactions between
them in the form of a computer-based interactive
visual model. The model is comprised of macro- and
micro-system diagrams that are linked hierarchically
to one another and dynamically to databases to cap-
ture the complexity of healthcare systems.
There is a tremendous need for further research to
understand the causes and consequences of errors in
primary care. It is hoped that the proposed visual
model based on a formal ‘systems engineering ap-
proach’ can serve as a framework to guide and shape
some of these eﬀorts.
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